After my class in Biology last Friday, a student came running after me to hand over a paper (drenched with tears?) that I recognized as an essay to my question, "What do you make of the Third Quarter?" I did not know at once how to react. I thought that perhaps, the best thing to do at that time is to approach her and tell her that the Third Quarter had been very demanding academically, but that her performace proved wanting... But there's more to the paper that brought me to a state of reflective silence. The question I gave came back to me. What do I make of the Third Quarter?
I thought the Third Quarter has been quite a tough one academically. I thought that it was one super quarter that ushered in a host of academic activities like the concert... and the other concerts. I thought that it was one difficult quarter that was made even more difficult by the topics that should've needed continuity but was denied with one given the series of breaks that figured as holidays or rehearsals. Comparative Anatomy needed continuity. Inorganic Chemistry's logic is sequential. Deny both the momentum that each needed to push the facts across and you get gaps in learning.
To my mind, such is the state of the Third Quarter. But there's not much that can be undone now. But having thus described the Third Quarter as one difficult quarter, I also thought that my students are not left without munition to help themselves out of the bind. A difficult task is made easy by summoning extra effort to stave off unnecessary academic distress.
So what do I make of the Third Quarter?
The Third quarter is one moment in time when we learn our lessons the hard way. If in failing we learn to hope for triumph then let failing be so. If in failing we learn to pick up the pieces of a squandered opportunity and learn to move forward, then let failing be so.
But while at this, let it be known that I still hold on to the quote from Plato I gave during that lecture on Friday, "The greatness of a teacher is best measured by the quality of his students."
My hope is that, like the oyster, you be able to make this academic irritant into an academic pearl. An academic pearl that will become the mark of quality students that you are. Then I can sit back with the thought that I have reaped from your struggle, my own struggle for that fruition of an earthly crown - the opportunity to touch as many lives as my own life can.
Sunday, January 28, 2007
Saturday, January 27, 2007
Academic Difficulties
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There is one very familiar quip coming from my students that I don't get to miss hearing before every exams... "Sir mahirap ba yong test?" Of course I have a ready reply to questions like this. I tell the unsuspecting student that the degree of difficulty of the test is directly related to the level of effort exerted in preparing for it. But going by the same logic, the surest way therefore to gauge the difficulty of a test (relative to the student) is to check at the end of the test whether the student failed or not. This of course does not give reliable results most of the time, hence the fallacy of the claim.
Students this time around (a week after the exams week) are perhaps doubly wary or panicky of uncertain prospects about their performance for the quarter. The week that was and the coming week will take on a mystified animation. Is the mark under the tree (three)? At Berea, a good marking performance stops counting at three. Already, tears have welled from the eyes that have just stayed the night out during the exams... But the quarterly gradings can no longer be undone... Hopes are now anchored on the prospect of getting a mark under the tree (three).
I asked my students... "What do you make of the Third Quarter?" Then a litany of self-deprecating but remorseful recollections and explications germinated out of gloom's horizon. I understand... There's much to be done in the final quarter. And the life of the brain must be nourished still...
Friday, January 19, 2007
A Compendium Cum Evaluation On "Pragmatism and Education by Gerald Gutek"
Summary
Gutek, in his article, "Pragmatism and Education", provided a historical and scientific background to the flourishing of the Pragmatist perspective on education. He recognized that John Dewey's Pragmatism grew as an offshoot to Rousseau's Naturalism and Spencer's Social Darwinism. But along the way, Dewey's Pragmatist perspective evolved to achieve refinement with the incorporation into its system of Mead's experimental learning and advocacy of the Pragmatist view that learning has to be "directed toward social reforms".
Gutek offered that Pragmatism was a philosophical expression of America's "frontier experience" that provided for a re-qualification of success based on the repercussions that come as a result of their attempt to transform their different environments for varied human purposes. He stated that Pragmatism came into the picture at a time when Science has quantum-leaped the ushering in of a "technological society" that will become the defining force of the Twentieth Century.
Gutek's examination of Pragmatism centralizes on Dewey's Experimentalism or Instrumentalism. He submits that Dewey's approach to philosophy appropriates the employment of the Scientific Method. Consistent to this method are the identification of a problem or the recognition of a problematic situation, its definition and clarification, construction of a tentative hypothesis, and the actual experimentation process. Such clearly defined steps according to Dewey, approximates the occurrence in the individual of a genuine thought.
With science and its methodology knitted closely into the fabric of the Pragmatist perspective, gradual if not outright rejection of metaphysical absolutes and the "Doctrine of no change", became of paramount concern to the evolution of Pragmatism. Idealism was alternately complemented and supplanted with breakthrough ideas from the sciences. Gutek noted that coinciding with the birth of Dewey is the publication of Darwin's "On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection". Darwin's scientific influence on Dewey can hardly be underestimated. Darwin's thesis on evolution stipulates that populations go through gradual change through time depending upon what becomes of their interaction with their environment.
The influence of evolutionary science to Dewey's Pragmatist perspective according to Gutek is best defined by considering the application of evolutionary principles to social situations. Here is when he noted Herbert Spencer's "Social Darwinism" which stipulates that "competition is a natural order of life".
Both Biological and Social Darwinism influenced Dewey in morphing out his Pragmatist perspective. Dewey believed that human beings, (more than the Rousseauean doctrine of becoming one with nature, or Spencer's fierce struggle with nature for survival), have to utilize nature to promote their advancement and welfare.
Dewey's Theory of Valuation sums it all. This theory is his attempt at unifying "aims, means, and ends". The premise here is that, one has to be accommodating of a broad spectrum of ideas that come from the individual's interaction with other individuals and with nature. On account of which, man accords himself with the means with which he places himself in a better position to make the most out of the interaction.
Implications For Education
In this section, Gutek outlined certain aspects of Dewey's educational philosophy ranging from the conservative and reconstructive processes of Experimentalist education to the forming of a democratic setting for education with the end-in-view of beefing up the curriculum to meet desirable educative outcomes.
Gutek noted that in Dewey's Democracy and Education, the learner is a legitimate participant within a cultural setting. his education comes from a conscious perception of nature without any reference to Idealist antecedents of truth. To learn from a pragmatist viewpoint therefore, is to understand nature through experience by the sensory organs.
Dewey's conservative and reconstructive concept of education posits that transmission of heritage has to proceed in the context of "cultural continuity". Within the society, Dewey claims that a learner can make use of the instrumentalities inherent to the group for the bifurcated purpose of liberating himself and defining his setting.
Education is recognized by Dewey as the "transmitter of the cultural heritage". Implicit to this, he claimed that a learner has to actively engage himself in the dynamism of a structured society - not necessarily to be imposed with strictures willed by the majority in the group and in the process lose his identity as in the Rousseauean sense, or to be locked in Spencerian struggle for social survival, but to be elemental in its definition, interactive in making it a better place to live in, and conscious of the available resources at his disposal that will be instrumental to his liberation.
Evaluation
The Pragmatist perspective is, to a large extent, an American philosophy whose system dates back to Greek thinking. Its widespread practice metamorphosed the entire system of Pragmatism into a multifaceted viewpoint subscribed to by proponents that are equally diverse in their regard of the Pragmatist perspective. Some think of it as a system of realistic idealism, others as a case of idealistic realism. Either way, adherents to this philosophy are one in saying that Pragmatism is but a new way of looking at old ideas in an effort to "do justice" to a broad spectrum of human experience.
The pragmatist is primarily concerned with the activity of knowing through the employment of the methods of science and the relationship of ideas to action. He claims that human beings can only be clear-headed about their ideas if and when the same ideas entail consequences that are material to him and are of certain practical purpose in the achievement of his "being".
Educationally, the methods of reflective thinking are fundamental to Pragmatism. Such methods provide for a framework in which reflection is complemented by action, or ideas being translated into practice.Others prefer to call it praxis which takes on the compromise between reflection (verbalism) and action (activism).
The Pragmatist perspective attempts to inculcate in the learner the judgments (and the parameters with which such judgments were arrived at) that men made to define the society (and the cultural heritage that was germinated from it) of which he is a part. This society is presumed to have promoted that interest and welfare of the members who are active participants.
Thus, in Dewey's Democracy and Education, Pragmatism placed emphases on the need for the learner to be able to solve problems that will be helpful to him. Moreover, ideas derived from the Experimentalist education has to cater to a certain social role that is receptive of social wants. And as society changes, the learner must keep himself apace with new developments by learning to be adaptive and interactive. There hardly is any fault to be found here given the conditions with which the Pragmatist perspective evolved and diversified.
It is therefore a matter of personal conviction to note how current educational systems have coped so well having subscribed to the Experimentalist framework of education.
Gutek, in his article, "Pragmatism and Education", provided a historical and scientific background to the flourishing of the Pragmatist perspective on education. He recognized that John Dewey's Pragmatism grew as an offshoot to Rousseau's Naturalism and Spencer's Social Darwinism. But along the way, Dewey's Pragmatist perspective evolved to achieve refinement with the incorporation into its system of Mead's experimental learning and advocacy of the Pragmatist view that learning has to be "directed toward social reforms".
Gutek offered that Pragmatism was a philosophical expression of America's "frontier experience" that provided for a re-qualification of success based on the repercussions that come as a result of their attempt to transform their different environments for varied human purposes. He stated that Pragmatism came into the picture at a time when Science has quantum-leaped the ushering in of a "technological society" that will become the defining force of the Twentieth Century.
Gutek's examination of Pragmatism centralizes on Dewey's Experimentalism or Instrumentalism. He submits that Dewey's approach to philosophy appropriates the employment of the Scientific Method. Consistent to this method are the identification of a problem or the recognition of a problematic situation, its definition and clarification, construction of a tentative hypothesis, and the actual experimentation process. Such clearly defined steps according to Dewey, approximates the occurrence in the individual of a genuine thought.
With science and its methodology knitted closely into the fabric of the Pragmatist perspective, gradual if not outright rejection of metaphysical absolutes and the "Doctrine of no change", became of paramount concern to the evolution of Pragmatism. Idealism was alternately complemented and supplanted with breakthrough ideas from the sciences. Gutek noted that coinciding with the birth of Dewey is the publication of Darwin's "On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection". Darwin's scientific influence on Dewey can hardly be underestimated. Darwin's thesis on evolution stipulates that populations go through gradual change through time depending upon what becomes of their interaction with their environment.
The influence of evolutionary science to Dewey's Pragmatist perspective according to Gutek is best defined by considering the application of evolutionary principles to social situations. Here is when he noted Herbert Spencer's "Social Darwinism" which stipulates that "competition is a natural order of life".
Both Biological and Social Darwinism influenced Dewey in morphing out his Pragmatist perspective. Dewey believed that human beings, (more than the Rousseauean doctrine of becoming one with nature, or Spencer's fierce struggle with nature for survival), have to utilize nature to promote their advancement and welfare.
Dewey's Theory of Valuation sums it all. This theory is his attempt at unifying "aims, means, and ends". The premise here is that, one has to be accommodating of a broad spectrum of ideas that come from the individual's interaction with other individuals and with nature. On account of which, man accords himself with the means with which he places himself in a better position to make the most out of the interaction.
Implications For Education
In this section, Gutek outlined certain aspects of Dewey's educational philosophy ranging from the conservative and reconstructive processes of Experimentalist education to the forming of a democratic setting for education with the end-in-view of beefing up the curriculum to meet desirable educative outcomes.
Gutek noted that in Dewey's Democracy and Education, the learner is a legitimate participant within a cultural setting. his education comes from a conscious perception of nature without any reference to Idealist antecedents of truth. To learn from a pragmatist viewpoint therefore, is to understand nature through experience by the sensory organs.
Dewey's conservative and reconstructive concept of education posits that transmission of heritage has to proceed in the context of "cultural continuity". Within the society, Dewey claims that a learner can make use of the instrumentalities inherent to the group for the bifurcated purpose of liberating himself and defining his setting.
Education is recognized by Dewey as the "transmitter of the cultural heritage". Implicit to this, he claimed that a learner has to actively engage himself in the dynamism of a structured society - not necessarily to be imposed with strictures willed by the majority in the group and in the process lose his identity as in the Rousseauean sense, or to be locked in Spencerian struggle for social survival, but to be elemental in its definition, interactive in making it a better place to live in, and conscious of the available resources at his disposal that will be instrumental to his liberation.
Evaluation
The Pragmatist perspective is, to a large extent, an American philosophy whose system dates back to Greek thinking. Its widespread practice metamorphosed the entire system of Pragmatism into a multifaceted viewpoint subscribed to by proponents that are equally diverse in their regard of the Pragmatist perspective. Some think of it as a system of realistic idealism, others as a case of idealistic realism. Either way, adherents to this philosophy are one in saying that Pragmatism is but a new way of looking at old ideas in an effort to "do justice" to a broad spectrum of human experience.
The pragmatist is primarily concerned with the activity of knowing through the employment of the methods of science and the relationship of ideas to action. He claims that human beings can only be clear-headed about their ideas if and when the same ideas entail consequences that are material to him and are of certain practical purpose in the achievement of his "being".
Educationally, the methods of reflective thinking are fundamental to Pragmatism. Such methods provide for a framework in which reflection is complemented by action, or ideas being translated into practice.Others prefer to call it praxis which takes on the compromise between reflection (verbalism) and action (activism).
The Pragmatist perspective attempts to inculcate in the learner the judgments (and the parameters with which such judgments were arrived at) that men made to define the society (and the cultural heritage that was germinated from it) of which he is a part. This society is presumed to have promoted that interest and welfare of the members who are active participants.
Thus, in Dewey's Democracy and Education, Pragmatism placed emphases on the need for the learner to be able to solve problems that will be helpful to him. Moreover, ideas derived from the Experimentalist education has to cater to a certain social role that is receptive of social wants. And as society changes, the learner must keep himself apace with new developments by learning to be adaptive and interactive. There hardly is any fault to be found here given the conditions with which the Pragmatist perspective evolved and diversified.
It is therefore a matter of personal conviction to note how current educational systems have coped so well having subscribed to the Experimentalist framework of education.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
A Compendium Cum Evaluation On "Naturalism and Education by Gerald Gutek"
Summary
Gutek's article on Naturalism and Education began with a definition of Naturalism and an enumeration of the leading proponents of the Naturalist philosophy that included the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and Herbert Spencer.
Naturalism according to Gutek is adherent to a single natural and physical principle, "which is matter in motion". This single principle is recognized by him as the tie that binds the many Naturalists who hold as many Naturalist views ranging from Rouseau's Romanticist perspective of human nature to Herbert Spencer's Darwinian Evolutionary view that holds that ethical systems are highly competitive.
Gutek recognized that nature and everything that is natural are fundamental to the Naturalist educational theory. As nature asserts its influence to complement human nature, education evolves slowly and very gradually to approximate the equally slow and gradual process of a child's development. For this reason, Gutek maintains that consistent to the educative ideals of naturalism , education has to be unhurried.
Another common belief in Naturalism is that, one has to make use of his senses to comprehend the workings of nature. Comprehension in this sense recognizes that the mind has its own way of unraveling truths about things, and that knowledge of them is based upon the sensations that pass through a sentient organism's sensory organs.
Basically, Rouseau's Naturalist philosophical theses are mirrored in both his The Social Contract and Emile. The Social Contract detailed how the individual lost his identity to the group that accommodated him. The fading or mixing in of the individual to the group is figured by Rouseau as caused by the sheer influence of the will of the many upon the will of one. In the end, the pressure is unilaterally directed upon the individual for him to succumb to the general will and be identified as belonging to the group.
In Emile, Rouseau illustrated his Naturalist/Romanticist philosophy in the character of a boy who has been raised and educated away from the corrupting influences of urbanity and the sophistications that go with it. Rousseau believed that the experience of a natural education prepared Emile to resist and overcome the distortions to genuine education entailed by being enmeshed in a structured society. Such distortions are what Rousseau termed as "amour propre", or pride with all the appurtenances of control, domination, and other means for "social aggrandizement". Conversely, the natural education that Emile obtained, developed in him what Rousseau called, "amour de soi", or love of oneself, that geared him up to become the genuine person that he is - uncorrupted and innocent.
On account of Rousseau's idea of growth and development being gradual, he postulated that like a child going through stages of maturity, education has to be programmed to meet the specific demands that are required for a specific stage. Such stages of human growth and development are identified by Rousseau as: infancy, childhood, preadolescence, adolescence, and young adulthood. Through the second stage, henceforth, Emile is introduced to and taught with the concept of "negative education". Here, Emile is sanitized of the influences of society. Proscriptions preventive of naturalist deviations are imposed upon him and a tracked up Naturalist orientation is inculcated into the young mind.
Implications for Education
Gutek's recognition of Naturalism's implications for education is gleaned from his identification of six Naturalist themes: nature and the natural; Naturalist epistemology; axiology and values; human growth and development from a Naturalist perspective; a Naturalist view of the curriculum; and the teacher-learner relationship in the Naturalist context.
He maintains that nature and the "natural" are key elements in the Naturalist perspective of education. As the terms suggest, the Naturalist is more inclined to submit that a learner is better off educated from the artificialities of society. The premise here being that society imposes unnecessarily, certain corrupting influences upon the individual. the genuineness of the individual's "person" is adulterated with the pressure to make himself fit in and belong to a group with which he can find a common and shared interest. To this end, Naturalism stipulates that leaving the child in his primitive and original state influenced only by sheer motives resulting from the learner's "unspoiled instincts", equips him with unselfish and enlightened understanding of nature as a living source of human growth and development.
On the Naturalist epistemology, Gutek stipulates that though Naturalism did not depart much from the Aristotelian Natural Realism on the basis of their shared scientific realist perspective, it however deviated from the Greek educative methodology of verbalism which was the preferred mode in the latter period of antiquity. Naturalism espoused the "doctrine that we learn through our senses". Implicit to this, is the progressivist claim that a learner learns first-hand if he or she immerses in and with nature and find for him or herself out the intricacies of nature's workings. For this, the Naturalists agree with the Progressivists in promoting sensory experience through means like "field-trips and excursions".
Another common belief in Naturalism as identified by Gutek zeroes in on the Naturalist perspective of axiology, values, and human nature. The Naturalist recognizes that there are two forms of self-esteem: the "amour de soi" and the "amour propre", which take on the natural and social dimensions, respectively. For Rousseau, the natural person or the "noble savage" is good and harbors no inherent evil in his heart. It is on this account that Rousseauean education has to be re-programmed in such a way that desensitization of the child is reduced. Consistent with this, is the concept of negative education. This kind of education employs both prescription and proscription as deemed necessary in the negation of artificialities and contrivances formulated from civilized societies. Such artificialities and contrivances according to Rousseau are counter-productive to the growth and development of the child.
As human growth and development proceed through stages that are cumulative, Naturalists argue that genuine education is and should be situated in accordance with the identified level of preparedness of the individual. Hence, the curriculum has to be devised in such a way that it becomes responsive and receptive to the "being" of the learner.
Evaluation
Naturalism in the Rousseauean sense purports that the learner can genuinely approach the realization of his "being" through an educative process that is detached significantly from the artificialities of a structured society. And as the child perfects his education in a natural setting. Rousseau make out of him a natural person who has developed "amour de soi" that enables him to ward off and overcome the corrupting influence of society.
These Naturalist assertions are practical in a sense that they are rendered operational in a material {natural} setting. But then, whether they are practicable in the context of current educational structures leaves ample room for doubt. Considering the trend with which education, the world over, is rationalized based on Dewey's Pragmatist philosophical perspective, it will be a case of high improbability to turn back the hands of time and pit off anticipated presupposed outcomes against experimentally warranted educative outcomes that the current educational situation has put in place. To this end, it is logical to ask whether infusion of resources into experiments on the naturalist perspective is worth it all. In the Philippine setting, the closest perhaps that can be ascribed with the Naturalist perspective of education is the system that serves as the basis for the establishment of the Philippine High School for the Arts (PHSA). Students who qualify for scholarship at the PHSA are those who are inherently endowed with skills and acumen that are geared towards the arts. The curriculum therefore is redesigned to suit the aesthetic needs and inclinations of the students. On top of this, the school is situated in the pristine environs of Mt. Makiling. More than the complementary relationship between nature and nurture though, no other naturalist tenet may be ascertained as associational to the PHSA system.
The evolution of societies from the period of antiquity to societies that are the inventions of our current collective civilizations has, but proceeded in a linearly progressive manner. Implicit to this, the human experience within a structured society has but progressed from primitive to advanced, technologically. Technology must be understood as a contrivance in itself that is reflective of the evolution through which the mind leapt within the confines of a social structure. Having said this, is there not a Naturalist perspective that relaxes the inflexibility of attributing to society all the evils and none of the good?
William Golding, in his novel, "Lord of the Flies" has this to warn us about. That apart from civilization, man has the tendency to revert back to his atavistic instincts. But then again, perhaps not.
Gutek's article on Naturalism and Education began with a definition of Naturalism and an enumeration of the leading proponents of the Naturalist philosophy that included the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and Herbert Spencer.
Naturalism according to Gutek is adherent to a single natural and physical principle, "which is matter in motion". This single principle is recognized by him as the tie that binds the many Naturalists who hold as many Naturalist views ranging from Rouseau's Romanticist perspective of human nature to Herbert Spencer's Darwinian Evolutionary view that holds that ethical systems are highly competitive.
Gutek recognized that nature and everything that is natural are fundamental to the Naturalist educational theory. As nature asserts its influence to complement human nature, education evolves slowly and very gradually to approximate the equally slow and gradual process of a child's development. For this reason, Gutek maintains that consistent to the educative ideals of naturalism , education has to be unhurried.
Another common belief in Naturalism is that, one has to make use of his senses to comprehend the workings of nature. Comprehension in this sense recognizes that the mind has its own way of unraveling truths about things, and that knowledge of them is based upon the sensations that pass through a sentient organism's sensory organs.
Basically, Rouseau's Naturalist philosophical theses are mirrored in both his The Social Contract and Emile. The Social Contract detailed how the individual lost his identity to the group that accommodated him. The fading or mixing in of the individual to the group is figured by Rouseau as caused by the sheer influence of the will of the many upon the will of one. In the end, the pressure is unilaterally directed upon the individual for him to succumb to the general will and be identified as belonging to the group.
In Emile, Rouseau illustrated his Naturalist/Romanticist philosophy in the character of a boy who has been raised and educated away from the corrupting influences of urbanity and the sophistications that go with it. Rousseau believed that the experience of a natural education prepared Emile to resist and overcome the distortions to genuine education entailed by being enmeshed in a structured society. Such distortions are what Rousseau termed as "amour propre", or pride with all the appurtenances of control, domination, and other means for "social aggrandizement". Conversely, the natural education that Emile obtained, developed in him what Rousseau called, "amour de soi", or love of oneself, that geared him up to become the genuine person that he is - uncorrupted and innocent.
On account of Rousseau's idea of growth and development being gradual, he postulated that like a child going through stages of maturity, education has to be programmed to meet the specific demands that are required for a specific stage. Such stages of human growth and development are identified by Rousseau as: infancy, childhood, preadolescence, adolescence, and young adulthood. Through the second stage, henceforth, Emile is introduced to and taught with the concept of "negative education". Here, Emile is sanitized of the influences of society. Proscriptions preventive of naturalist deviations are imposed upon him and a tracked up Naturalist orientation is inculcated into the young mind.
Implications for Education
Gutek's recognition of Naturalism's implications for education is gleaned from his identification of six Naturalist themes: nature and the natural; Naturalist epistemology; axiology and values; human growth and development from a Naturalist perspective; a Naturalist view of the curriculum; and the teacher-learner relationship in the Naturalist context.
He maintains that nature and the "natural" are key elements in the Naturalist perspective of education. As the terms suggest, the Naturalist is more inclined to submit that a learner is better off educated from the artificialities of society. The premise here being that society imposes unnecessarily, certain corrupting influences upon the individual. the genuineness of the individual's "person" is adulterated with the pressure to make himself fit in and belong to a group with which he can find a common and shared interest. To this end, Naturalism stipulates that leaving the child in his primitive and original state influenced only by sheer motives resulting from the learner's "unspoiled instincts", equips him with unselfish and enlightened understanding of nature as a living source of human growth and development.
On the Naturalist epistemology, Gutek stipulates that though Naturalism did not depart much from the Aristotelian Natural Realism on the basis of their shared scientific realist perspective, it however deviated from the Greek educative methodology of verbalism which was the preferred mode in the latter period of antiquity. Naturalism espoused the "doctrine that we learn through our senses". Implicit to this, is the progressivist claim that a learner learns first-hand if he or she immerses in and with nature and find for him or herself out the intricacies of nature's workings. For this, the Naturalists agree with the Progressivists in promoting sensory experience through means like "field-trips and excursions".
Another common belief in Naturalism as identified by Gutek zeroes in on the Naturalist perspective of axiology, values, and human nature. The Naturalist recognizes that there are two forms of self-esteem: the "amour de soi" and the "amour propre", which take on the natural and social dimensions, respectively. For Rousseau, the natural person or the "noble savage" is good and harbors no inherent evil in his heart. It is on this account that Rousseauean education has to be re-programmed in such a way that desensitization of the child is reduced. Consistent with this, is the concept of negative education. This kind of education employs both prescription and proscription as deemed necessary in the negation of artificialities and contrivances formulated from civilized societies. Such artificialities and contrivances according to Rousseau are counter-productive to the growth and development of the child.
As human growth and development proceed through stages that are cumulative, Naturalists argue that genuine education is and should be situated in accordance with the identified level of preparedness of the individual. Hence, the curriculum has to be devised in such a way that it becomes responsive and receptive to the "being" of the learner.
Evaluation
Naturalism in the Rousseauean sense purports that the learner can genuinely approach the realization of his "being" through an educative process that is detached significantly from the artificialities of a structured society. And as the child perfects his education in a natural setting. Rousseau make out of him a natural person who has developed "amour de soi" that enables him to ward off and overcome the corrupting influence of society.
These Naturalist assertions are practical in a sense that they are rendered operational in a material {natural} setting. But then, whether they are practicable in the context of current educational structures leaves ample room for doubt. Considering the trend with which education, the world over, is rationalized based on Dewey's Pragmatist philosophical perspective, it will be a case of high improbability to turn back the hands of time and pit off anticipated presupposed outcomes against experimentally warranted educative outcomes that the current educational situation has put in place. To this end, it is logical to ask whether infusion of resources into experiments on the naturalist perspective is worth it all. In the Philippine setting, the closest perhaps that can be ascribed with the Naturalist perspective of education is the system that serves as the basis for the establishment of the Philippine High School for the Arts (PHSA). Students who qualify for scholarship at the PHSA are those who are inherently endowed with skills and acumen that are geared towards the arts. The curriculum therefore is redesigned to suit the aesthetic needs and inclinations of the students. On top of this, the school is situated in the pristine environs of Mt. Makiling. More than the complementary relationship between nature and nurture though, no other naturalist tenet may be ascertained as associational to the PHSA system.
The evolution of societies from the period of antiquity to societies that are the inventions of our current collective civilizations has, but proceeded in a linearly progressive manner. Implicit to this, the human experience within a structured society has but progressed from primitive to advanced, technologically. Technology must be understood as a contrivance in itself that is reflective of the evolution through which the mind leapt within the confines of a social structure. Having said this, is there not a Naturalist perspective that relaxes the inflexibility of attributing to society all the evils and none of the good?
William Golding, in his novel, "Lord of the Flies" has this to warn us about. That apart from civilization, man has the tendency to revert back to his atavistic instincts. But then again, perhaps not.
Monday, January 15, 2007
A Compendium Cum Evaluation On "Existentialism and Education by Gerald Gutek"
Summary
Gerald Gutek in his article titled, "Existentialism and Education", indirectly hinted that the Existentialist philosophical perspective is relatively new in a sense that it's influence is yet to take its toll and on account of the premise that it was only after the Second World War that its reach and impact flourished in Europe and elsewhere.
Gutek recognized that Existentialism is not a boxed up 'system of thought". It is according to him, more of an inclination labeled as such in an attempt at convenience to ascribe a nomenclature to a range of "differing revolts against Traditional Philosophy".
Gutek, in this article, presented two of the pioneering and more renowned Existentialist philosophers: Soren Kierkegaard, a Christian, and Jean-Paul Sartre, an atheist.
Gutek, in his presentation of Kierkegaard and Sartre, provided sufficient background of them to contextualize the Existentialist thoughts that they championed either as a means with which they deconstructed the authoritarian status-quo prevalent during their times or simply as an academic tussle against philosophical Idealism and the "absolutes" that were elemental to it.
On one hand, he characterized Kierkegaard as a free-thinker who refused any and all forms of subjugation to and by the pantheistic inflexibilities of the Danish Lutheran Church of his time. He also noted the commentary Kierkegaard used to counter Hegel's 'Philosophical Idealism". It centralized on the "architectonic philosophical system" purported by Hegel which, according to Kierkegaard, finds realization only in the state. He noted the impersonal and detached tendencies of Christians in the professions of their faith. Here is when Kierkegaard emphasized the term, "leap of faith". An act that engages one into a personal relationship with God on the basis of having the freedom to define one's "being-in-the-world" with meaning that, and as Kierkegaard suggested, will lead to "authenticity".
On the other hand, Gutek introduced Jean-Paul Sartre beginning with a detailed account of the Nazi setting that defined in more ways than one, the shaping of his Existentialist mind-set and extending to the irrationality and savagery of Hitler that rendered senseless any attempt at living life amidst a backdrop of wanton atavism and dehumanizing barbarism. Such are the conditions that Sartre has personally experienced in the prison camp.
With reference to this background, Gutek figures Sartre's Existentialism as embodied in a phrase the latter himself coined, "existence precedes essence". This neologized existential maxim refutes the existing traditional mind-set popularized in the early part of the Twentieth Century that presupposes an antecendent - not in the Aristotelian sense, that directs human nature.
Of particular interest in this article is the characterization with which Gutek painted a vivid portrait of a "lost" generation that saw the crisis of mass society. Such crisis provided for a fertile philosophical landscape that invited man to re-examine his Existential purpose and relationship of such purpose to existence and essence.
Here, he noted how humans became a mere extension of machines. Gutek cited for instance the factory workers who worked alongside contrivances or gadgets that did most of the work and that needed very little complementary assistance from the human workforce. Assembly lines were built to jack up the mass production of goods. Hardly has man (the masses) coped with the technological advancement characteristic of the time defined by a world at war.
Educationally, Existentialism is critical of the systematically standardized and neatly packaged curriculums that are targeted at students, invariably classified according to age, academic preparation, and scholastic orientation. Existentialism in this regard purports the reduction of "impersonalization that has affected schooling", and the introduction of the "I-Thou" relationship between the mentor and the learner. Gutek also noted the "rejection of systems" in the Existentialist perspective. Needless to say, Existentialism has practically detached itself to any traditional philosophical belief-systems. This however, is just half of the Existentialist equation. The other half enmeshes an attack on Pragmatism's employment of the scientific method through experimentalism. The Existentialist sees in this situation the individual being"overwhelmed" in his/her interaction with "like-minded" persons that forces him/her to decide, mindful of the collective will of the group.
Implications For Education
On Existentialism's implications for education, Gutek took on the US educational tradition. Here, he emphasized the public school conception that is supposed to be receptive and accommodative of the diversity characteristic of the American Society. It is on account of this premise that a need for an institutionalization of cultural pluralism is recognized.
But Gutek noted that the Existentialist perspective is critical of the group-oriented mode of learning based on Dewey's Pragmatist Experimentalism.
Existentialism posits that mentors have to be very wary about infringing too much into the educative hemispheres of the learner. Gutek maintains that the "I-Thou" relationship still serves as ground upon which Existential philosophizing in education is anchored.
Educationally, Existentialism holds that the school, being one that is situated in the material world has to provide a realistic atmosphere that invites optimization of the learner's potential to make choices that help him/her achieve authenticity in the context of individuality. But such an atmosphere has to equally provide situations where recognition of consequences comes in tandem with the Existential pursuit for freedom within the educative framework.
Evaluation
Existentialism is a mind-set that accords premium to man's freedom to make choices that he deems instrumental in his pursuit for authenticity. For this, Existentialism provided a perspective that is alternative to Hegel's Idealism that heralded the virtues of absolute and universalizable truths about the material cosmos. It has to be noted though that authenticity in education is adumbrated with value-creation without reference to any external antecedent. Man is presumed to have the facility to choose from among options that he regards as contributory to the definition of his own person and the unraveling of the essence of his existence. Hence, unlike that of Plato's claim that man is antecendently good until he immerses himself in society, Existentialism following Sartre's claim, is consistent with the making of a man by him and for himself with nothing else to boot but himself and the environment that he is in contact with.
Following Kierkegaard's claim however, a twist gets into the picture with Existentialism being equated to Christianism. A "leap of faith" is what Kierkegaard considered as elemental in the realization of man's Christian life.
Jostein Gaarder, author of Sophie's World, in a chapter on Kierkegaard as told in the same aforementioned book, started with a philosophical inebriation. Sophie was handed over with two bottles, one red and the other blue, by a young girl named Alice. The bottles were very inviting in their labels that read, "Drink me" and "Drink me too". Sophie at first hesitated aas they "might be poisonous". The red bottle altered Sophie's world into one that caused everything to proceed into a grand fusion. This was associational to Hegel's Pantheism or Idealism. The blue bottle is Kierkegaard's virtual world-design for Sophie where everything is and has a world of its own.
Kierkegaard's Existentialist perspective purports a dangerously tempting proposition that puts premium on claims that are hanging loose on thin air like love, forgiveness, and the like. As there exists no measure with which the validity of such claims is gauged, Kierkegaard offered that this very uncertainty adds up to his assertion that claims of this species are more meaningful. "Meaning" in this regard emanates from one's faith in the person making the claim and from one's personal valuation of the claim made. For himj, subjective truth is more important than its objective counterpart. To firm this claim up, he posited that the truth value of the claim that you've been forgiven is more important than the truth value of the geometric claim that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees. Here is when Sophie has every reason to be worried about getting poisoned or intoxicated. Unfortunately, for Kierkegaard, he did not live long enough to witness the retrogression of his "leap of faith" down to "leap of extremism". Blind faith yielded to the ubiquity of "holier than thou's" whose minds are devoid of any form of reason other than that which they hold dear in their hearts for warranting them salvation. But that's another story. It is now a matter of conjectural interest to learn how he would have leapt out of faith after September the 11th.
Sartre reasoned from the pulpits of prison. To refute his Existentialist perspective that "existence precedes essence" is historicism to say the least. And while he ran short of advocating "live and let live", does it make the assertion less of a rule of common justice? To this end, Existentialism is better captured by Sartre than by Kierkegaard. But Kierkegaard lived his life happier perhaps. But then again, perhaps not.
Sunday, January 14, 2007
The Place Of Analytic Philosophy Of Education On the Education And Training Of School Teachers
Summary
The author, Prof. Evelina M. Orteza, in her article titled, "The Place Of Analytic Philosophy Of Education On The Education And Training Of School Teachers", made an attempt to show the central role and function of Analytic Philosophy in the education and training of school teachers.
Orteza's paper is dichotomized into two parts. The first part provided a commentary on Traditional Philosophy as practiced in education and its implication for certain "significant matters of formal education" like teaching, learning, and the curriculum. The second part provided an argument for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in teacher preparation programs.
In Orteza's commentary on the Traditional Philosophy of education, she raised several questions illustrative of a framework for abstract considerations that can guide educational practices along one's "accepted Traditional Philosophy of Education". And while she considered imaginable answers to traditional philosophic questions, she argued in this part the speculative nature of such questions and their dubious relation to practical problems.
As such, she queried if at all, these traditional methods of philosophizing could render clarity and order to concepts innate to the whole of the education enterprise. Here is when she offered the the introduction of the Analytic Philosophy of Education as instrumental to the discovery and development of "logical features" of terms independent of a philosophy of education.
Orteza, prior to her building up of a case for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers, defined "place" as pertaining to role and function, played and operated upon respectively, when dealing with problems appurtenant to education.
Three motivational questions were raised to indicate or show how Analytic Philosophy figures center stage on the conceptual and linguistic analysis of key educational concepts, expressions, and their relevant meanings. These questions are: "what do you mean?"; "How do you know?"; and "What may we pre-suppose?"...
As to the first question, "What do you mean?", she offered a linguistic analysis of the educational terms: teaching; conditioning; and indoctrinating. Worth noting in her analysis is her suggestion that teaching does not necessarily overlap with the concepts represented by the terms conditioning, training, and indoctrinating. Consequently, a case of mutual exclusivity may be drawn from the concepts represented by the terms: teacher; conditioner; trainer; and indoctrinator, as used in the linguistic situation of education. This, she differentiated strongly with situational actual linguistic examples, and with the end-in-view of preserving the "discriminatory force or power" of the terms as used.
Another equally worth noting in her qualification of the term teaching is that she has linked it up with the term learning as the conscious act of knowing what ought to be done and achieved by the learner. Orteza attempted to point out in this question the need to disambiguate the employment of certain terms in particular linguistic situations for purposes of clarity and precision.
Her second question, "How do you know?", attempts to show the need for the establishment of a valid ground in reason for one's claim. And that such ground serves as basis for the truth - or the lack of it, and its acceptance or rejection.
She argued that certain situations warrant that the truth of a claim be established according to a conscious recognition of its truth by the person making the claim. Such recognition comes as an actual observation of the truth of the claim for purposes of verification. Here is when Orteza acknowledged that the desirable case in teaching is when the learner's claim is of a verified truth and whose truth is recognized as such by the learner. She termed such a mental state as "one who knows".
On her third question: "What may we pre-suppose?", she cautioned against jumping to uncalled for conclusions. she recognized that there are certain linguistic situations that make use of concepts whose truth cannot be established by empirical warrants alone. Concepts in morality for instance, necessitate that they be used with recognition of the overriding moral principles that are germane in them. In the same manner, Orteza figured that matters of belief have to be understood in the religious context from which such beliefs find a logical knowledge domain. She argued in this sense that no language is superior to any other language for each language has its intrinsic role and function. This, according to Orteza, is what differentiates Analytic Philosophy from Traditional Philosophy. She posited that, more than the accumulation of a body of philosophic knowledge, Analytic Philosophy interests itself more on the activity of philosophizing.
To illustrate her point on the place of Analytic Philosophy of education on the education and training of school teachers, she identified teaching and learning as two independent activities. Common only to both is the logical truth that they are, in her words, "try verbs". This term suggests that other than the given activities that they purport, certain extraneous circumstances may yet prove to be influential in determining whether they succeed or fail. To this end, Orteza stipulated why, conceptually, the statement, "To teach is to cause to learn" is wrong, using in its strictest sense, the term "cause".
The other aspect in Orteza's definition of "place" is the presumed function in the linguistic situation of education. Here, she considered as problems, the encounters by teachers of "so-called" practical problems. She clarified the concept of practical problems by placing it in stark contrast to theoretical problems where the nature of the case comes of foremost consideration. Practical problems as defined by Orteza are "gaps, hindrances, or discrepancies" that come in the way of people who are suppose to do what they ought to do but are caught in a bind. Orteza's treatment of practical problems goes beyond identification of the nature of the case. She suggested that in encounters with practical problem, it is more important to do something about it, get out of the bind, and go on withe the activity. More than common sense, practical problems have to be dissected into their constituent parts and be addressed with know-hows that have "logical bearing on them".
Also on the function aspect of Analytic Philosophy's place in education, Orteza raised the need for teachers to know how to justify their acts. Considering that Analytic Philosophy is a second order activity, justification has to come from concepts that are confined in the dimension of the teacher's task. Simply put, an important part of the teacher's disciplined thinking is to be clear-headed about his task.
Critique
Prof. Evelina M. Oretza made a strong point in arguing for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Most illuminating in her paper is the clarity and precision with which she defined "place" as applied to the linguistic situation of education.She appropriated the elements of role and function to her definition of "place" and proceeded to expound on them.
Orteza, in building up her case for Analytic Philosophy, detailed how detached Traditional Philosophy is in addressing practical problems of foremost significance to teachers. As such, she offered Analytic Philosophy as a more practicable method of bringing about clarity in educative linguistic situations and receptive of the manner with which practical problems are resolved. There hardly is any fault to be found here, given the propensity with which Traditional Philosophy uses traditional concepts and methods to show how a learner's experiences, if organized to approximate certain assumptions, will result in the achievement of a good life. But to say that Traditional Philosophy is concerned more in raising and addressing speculative statements about the nature of truth and reality and that there is not much to expect from it is, to an extent, jumping the gun a bit. For, is there not a certain degree of probability in which Traditional Philosophy may complement Ananlytic Philosophy? Should Traditional Philosophy be supplemented entirely by Analytic Philosophy for the latter to assert its truth?
Orteza cited for instance, one problem in Traditional Philosophy arising from the existential claim that "human nature has no nature". Whether is be a presupposition devoid of any immediate value and implication for education, it may be raised that this is just a claim out of a multitude of other claims, valid or not, that an existentialist believes or adheres in. Educationally, Existentialism, as the case is in Realism, concerns itself more on how to gear the child up to better equip him with an understanding and acceptance of the demands made upon him by the laws of nature. Or, take the educational framework from Idealism. Educationally, Idealism is ideal-centered where learners are made to reflect through their selves, the eternal understandings of an Ideal existence. These may perhaps all fall under speculative statements and belief-systems, but this after all, is what Orteza incorporated as explanation in her attempt to answer her third motivational question, "What may we presuppose?". Did she not suggest that depending upon the nature of the statement under consideration, one must caution oneself from jumping to conclusions and consider first the knowledge domain of which the presupposed claim is a legitimate part?
There is hardly any dispute to Orteza's claim that clarity and precision in language need to be upheld in all possible situations where they are deemed necessary and due. She argued quite strongly on her first question, "What do you mean?". Her vivid differentiation of the concepts of teaching, training, conditioning, and indoctrinating is most enlightening to say the least. Properly defined, she has successfully linked teaching to learning and appropriately labeled them as "try verbs" based on the uncertainty - whether that of success or failure, of their outcomes.
Perhaps the only point that needs to be raised here is whether or not, Genetics figures much on the uncertainty of teaching-learning outcomes. It must be noted that central (or, associational?) to the intrinsic capacity of a learner to process statements in a given linguistic situation is the nature of the statement in question. Does it fall in a knowledge domain of high heritability value? If so, then all that the teacher has to do is help the learner optimize his genetic potential without much intervention to stimulate the learner's inclination, which in this case is genetically predetermined.
As to the second question,"How do you know?", Orteza's most fundamental claim centers on the proposition that "one who knows" is in a mental state that is cognizant of the truth of his claim and that such truth is verified to be true indeed. She managed to bring this idea out by providing a pointillistic description of the entirety of the knowing process, considering as discriminants for the making of a strong or weak case, the conditions of truth, evidence, and beliefs.
With very little doubt, all three questions have successfully carved out a place for Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Only a few randomly germinated questions come to mind. Like, why at all must Analytic Philosophy be labeled as a second order activity? Can it not be a case of an activity preceding the task of education and completing it?
Lastly, on account of the title, can the term education not provide a knowledge domain in which the term training finds a logical bearing?
The author, Prof. Evelina M. Orteza, in her article titled, "The Place Of Analytic Philosophy Of Education On The Education And Training Of School Teachers", made an attempt to show the central role and function of Analytic Philosophy in the education and training of school teachers.
Orteza's paper is dichotomized into two parts. The first part provided a commentary on Traditional Philosophy as practiced in education and its implication for certain "significant matters of formal education" like teaching, learning, and the curriculum. The second part provided an argument for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in teacher preparation programs.
In Orteza's commentary on the Traditional Philosophy of education, she raised several questions illustrative of a framework for abstract considerations that can guide educational practices along one's "accepted Traditional Philosophy of Education". And while she considered imaginable answers to traditional philosophic questions, she argued in this part the speculative nature of such questions and their dubious relation to practical problems.
As such, she queried if at all, these traditional methods of philosophizing could render clarity and order to concepts innate to the whole of the education enterprise. Here is when she offered the the introduction of the Analytic Philosophy of Education as instrumental to the discovery and development of "logical features" of terms independent of a philosophy of education.
Orteza, prior to her building up of a case for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers, defined "place" as pertaining to role and function, played and operated upon respectively, when dealing with problems appurtenant to education.
Three motivational questions were raised to indicate or show how Analytic Philosophy figures center stage on the conceptual and linguistic analysis of key educational concepts, expressions, and their relevant meanings. These questions are: "what do you mean?"; "How do you know?"; and "What may we pre-suppose?"...
As to the first question, "What do you mean?", she offered a linguistic analysis of the educational terms: teaching; conditioning; and indoctrinating. Worth noting in her analysis is her suggestion that teaching does not necessarily overlap with the concepts represented by the terms conditioning, training, and indoctrinating. Consequently, a case of mutual exclusivity may be drawn from the concepts represented by the terms: teacher; conditioner; trainer; and indoctrinator, as used in the linguistic situation of education. This, she differentiated strongly with situational actual linguistic examples, and with the end-in-view of preserving the "discriminatory force or power" of the terms as used.
Another equally worth noting in her qualification of the term teaching is that she has linked it up with the term learning as the conscious act of knowing what ought to be done and achieved by the learner. Orteza attempted to point out in this question the need to disambiguate the employment of certain terms in particular linguistic situations for purposes of clarity and precision.
Her second question, "How do you know?", attempts to show the need for the establishment of a valid ground in reason for one's claim. And that such ground serves as basis for the truth - or the lack of it, and its acceptance or rejection.
She argued that certain situations warrant that the truth of a claim be established according to a conscious recognition of its truth by the person making the claim. Such recognition comes as an actual observation of the truth of the claim for purposes of verification. Here is when Orteza acknowledged that the desirable case in teaching is when the learner's claim is of a verified truth and whose truth is recognized as such by the learner. She termed such a mental state as "one who knows".
On her third question: "What may we pre-suppose?", she cautioned against jumping to uncalled for conclusions. she recognized that there are certain linguistic situations that make use of concepts whose truth cannot be established by empirical warrants alone. Concepts in morality for instance, necessitate that they be used with recognition of the overriding moral principles that are germane in them. In the same manner, Orteza figured that matters of belief have to be understood in the religious context from which such beliefs find a logical knowledge domain. She argued in this sense that no language is superior to any other language for each language has its intrinsic role and function. This, according to Orteza, is what differentiates Analytic Philosophy from Traditional Philosophy. She posited that, more than the accumulation of a body of philosophic knowledge, Analytic Philosophy interests itself more on the activity of philosophizing.
To illustrate her point on the place of Analytic Philosophy of education on the education and training of school teachers, she identified teaching and learning as two independent activities. Common only to both is the logical truth that they are, in her words, "try verbs". This term suggests that other than the given activities that they purport, certain extraneous circumstances may yet prove to be influential in determining whether they succeed or fail. To this end, Orteza stipulated why, conceptually, the statement, "To teach is to cause to learn" is wrong, using in its strictest sense, the term "cause".
The other aspect in Orteza's definition of "place" is the presumed function in the linguistic situation of education. Here, she considered as problems, the encounters by teachers of "so-called" practical problems. She clarified the concept of practical problems by placing it in stark contrast to theoretical problems where the nature of the case comes of foremost consideration. Practical problems as defined by Orteza are "gaps, hindrances, or discrepancies" that come in the way of people who are suppose to do what they ought to do but are caught in a bind. Orteza's treatment of practical problems goes beyond identification of the nature of the case. She suggested that in encounters with practical problem, it is more important to do something about it, get out of the bind, and go on withe the activity. More than common sense, practical problems have to be dissected into their constituent parts and be addressed with know-hows that have "logical bearing on them".
Also on the function aspect of Analytic Philosophy's place in education, Orteza raised the need for teachers to know how to justify their acts. Considering that Analytic Philosophy is a second order activity, justification has to come from concepts that are confined in the dimension of the teacher's task. Simply put, an important part of the teacher's disciplined thinking is to be clear-headed about his task.
Critique
Prof. Evelina M. Oretza made a strong point in arguing for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Most illuminating in her paper is the clarity and precision with which she defined "place" as applied to the linguistic situation of education.She appropriated the elements of role and function to her definition of "place" and proceeded to expound on them.
Orteza, in building up her case for Analytic Philosophy, detailed how detached Traditional Philosophy is in addressing practical problems of foremost significance to teachers. As such, she offered Analytic Philosophy as a more practicable method of bringing about clarity in educative linguistic situations and receptive of the manner with which practical problems are resolved. There hardly is any fault to be found here, given the propensity with which Traditional Philosophy uses traditional concepts and methods to show how a learner's experiences, if organized to approximate certain assumptions, will result in the achievement of a good life. But to say that Traditional Philosophy is concerned more in raising and addressing speculative statements about the nature of truth and reality and that there is not much to expect from it is, to an extent, jumping the gun a bit. For, is there not a certain degree of probability in which Traditional Philosophy may complement Ananlytic Philosophy? Should Traditional Philosophy be supplemented entirely by Analytic Philosophy for the latter to assert its truth?
Orteza cited for instance, one problem in Traditional Philosophy arising from the existential claim that "human nature has no nature". Whether is be a presupposition devoid of any immediate value and implication for education, it may be raised that this is just a claim out of a multitude of other claims, valid or not, that an existentialist believes or adheres in. Educationally, Existentialism, as the case is in Realism, concerns itself more on how to gear the child up to better equip him with an understanding and acceptance of the demands made upon him by the laws of nature. Or, take the educational framework from Idealism. Educationally, Idealism is ideal-centered where learners are made to reflect through their selves, the eternal understandings of an Ideal existence. These may perhaps all fall under speculative statements and belief-systems, but this after all, is what Orteza incorporated as explanation in her attempt to answer her third motivational question, "What may we presuppose?". Did she not suggest that depending upon the nature of the statement under consideration, one must caution oneself from jumping to conclusions and consider first the knowledge domain of which the presupposed claim is a legitimate part?
There is hardly any dispute to Orteza's claim that clarity and precision in language need to be upheld in all possible situations where they are deemed necessary and due. She argued quite strongly on her first question, "What do you mean?". Her vivid differentiation of the concepts of teaching, training, conditioning, and indoctrinating is most enlightening to say the least. Properly defined, she has successfully linked teaching to learning and appropriately labeled them as "try verbs" based on the uncertainty - whether that of success or failure, of their outcomes.
Perhaps the only point that needs to be raised here is whether or not, Genetics figures much on the uncertainty of teaching-learning outcomes. It must be noted that central (or, associational?) to the intrinsic capacity of a learner to process statements in a given linguistic situation is the nature of the statement in question. Does it fall in a knowledge domain of high heritability value? If so, then all that the teacher has to do is help the learner optimize his genetic potential without much intervention to stimulate the learner's inclination, which in this case is genetically predetermined.
As to the second question,"How do you know?", Orteza's most fundamental claim centers on the proposition that "one who knows" is in a mental state that is cognizant of the truth of his claim and that such truth is verified to be true indeed. She managed to bring this idea out by providing a pointillistic description of the entirety of the knowing process, considering as discriminants for the making of a strong or weak case, the conditions of truth, evidence, and beliefs.
With very little doubt, all three questions have successfully carved out a place for Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Only a few randomly germinated questions come to mind. Like, why at all must Analytic Philosophy be labeled as a second order activity? Can it not be a case of an activity preceding the task of education and completing it?
Lastly, on account of the title, can the term education not provide a knowledge domain in which the term training finds a logical bearing?
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