The Place Of Analytic Philosophy Of Education On the Education And Training Of School Teachers

Summary

The author, Prof. Evelina M. Orteza, in her article titled, "The Place Of Analytic Philosophy Of Education On The Education And Training Of School Teachers", made an attempt to show the central role and function of Analytic Philosophy in the education and training of school teachers.

Orteza's paper is dichotomized into two parts. The first part provided a commentary on Traditional Philosophy as practiced in education and its implication for certain "significant matters of formal education" like teaching, learning, and the curriculum. The second part provided an argument for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in teacher preparation programs.

In Orteza's commentary on the Traditional Philosophy of education, she raised several questions illustrative of a framework for abstract considerations that can guide educational practices along one's "accepted Traditional Philosophy of Education". And while she considered imaginable answers to traditional philosophic questions, she argued in this part the speculative nature of such questions and their dubious relation to practical problems.

As such, she queried if at all, these traditional methods of philosophizing could render clarity and order to concepts innate to the whole of the education enterprise. Here is when she offered the the introduction of the Analytic Philosophy of Education as instrumental to the discovery and development of "logical features" of terms independent of a philosophy of education.

Orteza, prior to her building up of a case for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers, defined "place" as pertaining to role and function, played and operated upon respectively, when dealing with problems appurtenant to education.

Three motivational questions were raised to indicate or show how Analytic Philosophy figures center stage on the conceptual and linguistic analysis of key educational concepts, expressions, and their relevant meanings. These questions are: "what do you mean?"; "How do you know?"; and "What may we pre-suppose?"...

As to the first question, "What do you mean?", she offered a linguistic analysis of the educational terms: teaching; conditioning; and indoctrinating. Worth noting in her analysis is her suggestion that teaching does not necessarily overlap with the concepts represented by the terms conditioning, training, and indoctrinating. Consequently, a case of mutual exclusivity may be drawn from the concepts represented by the terms: teacher; conditioner; trainer; and indoctrinator, as used in the linguistic situation of education. This, she differentiated strongly with situational actual linguistic examples, and with the end-in-view of preserving the "discriminatory force or power" of the terms as used.

Another equally worth noting in her qualification of the term teaching is that she has linked it up with the term learning as the conscious act of knowing what ought to be done and achieved by the learner. Orteza attempted to point out in this question the need to disambiguate the employment of certain terms in particular linguistic situations for purposes of clarity and precision.

Her second question, "How do you know?", attempts to show the need for the establishment of a valid ground in reason for one's claim. And that such ground serves as basis for the truth - or the lack of it, and its acceptance or rejection.

She argued that certain situations warrant that the truth of a claim be established according to a conscious recognition of its truth by the person making the claim. Such recognition comes as an actual observation of the truth of the claim for purposes of verification. Here is when Orteza acknowledged that the desirable case in teaching is when the learner's claim is of a verified truth and whose truth is recognized as such by the learner. She termed such a mental state as "one who knows".

On her third question: "What may we pre-suppose?", she cautioned against jumping to uncalled for conclusions. she recognized that there are certain linguistic situations that make use of concepts whose truth cannot be established by empirical warrants alone. Concepts in morality for instance, necessitate that they be used with recognition of the overriding moral principles that are germane in them. In the same manner, Orteza figured that matters of belief have to be understood in the religious context from which such beliefs find a logical knowledge domain. She argued in this sense that no language is superior to any other language for each language has its intrinsic role and function. This, according to Orteza, is what differentiates Analytic Philosophy from Traditional Philosophy. She posited that, more than the accumulation of a body of philosophic knowledge, Analytic Philosophy interests itself more on the activity of philosophizing.

To illustrate her point on the place of Analytic Philosophy of education on the education and training of school teachers, she identified teaching and learning as two independent activities. Common only to both is the logical truth that they are, in her words, "try verbs". This term suggests that other than the given activities that they purport, certain extraneous circumstances may yet prove to be influential in determining whether they succeed or fail. To this end, Orteza stipulated why, conceptually, the statement, "To teach is to cause to learn" is wrong, using in its strictest sense, the term "cause".

The other aspect in Orteza's definition of "place" is the presumed function in the linguistic situation of education. Here, she considered as problems, the encounters by teachers of "so-called" practical problems. She clarified the concept of practical problems by placing it in stark contrast to theoretical problems where the nature of the case comes of foremost consideration. Practical problems as defined by Orteza are "gaps, hindrances, or discrepancies" that come in the way of people who are suppose to do what they ought to do but are caught in a bind. Orteza's treatment of practical problems goes beyond identification of the nature of the case. She suggested that in encounters with practical problem, it is more important to do something about it, get out of the bind, and go on withe the activity. More than common sense, practical problems have to be dissected into their constituent parts and be addressed with know-hows that have "logical bearing on them".

Also on the function aspect of Analytic Philosophy's place in education, Orteza raised the need for teachers to know how to justify their acts. Considering that Analytic Philosophy is a second order activity, justification has to come from concepts that are confined in the dimension of the teacher's task. Simply put, an important part of the teacher's disciplined thinking is to be clear-headed about his task.

Critique

Prof. Evelina M. Oretza made a strong point in arguing for the place of Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Most illuminating in her paper is the clarity and precision with which she defined "place" as applied to the linguistic situation of education.She appropriated the elements of role and function to her definition of "place" and proceeded to expound on them.

Orteza, in building up her case for Analytic Philosophy, detailed how detached Traditional Philosophy is in addressing practical problems of foremost significance to teachers. As such, she offered Analytic Philosophy as a more practicable method of bringing about clarity in educative linguistic situations and receptive of the manner with which practical problems are resolved. There hardly is any fault to be found here, given the propensity with which Traditional Philosophy uses traditional concepts and methods to show how a learner's experiences, if organized to approximate certain assumptions, will result in the achievement of a good life. But to say that Traditional Philosophy is concerned more in raising and addressing speculative statements about the nature of truth and reality and that there is not much to expect from it is, to an extent, jumping the gun a bit. For, is there not a certain degree of probability in which Traditional Philosophy may complement Ananlytic Philosophy? Should Traditional Philosophy be supplemented entirely by Analytic Philosophy for the latter to assert its truth?

Orteza cited for instance, one problem in Traditional Philosophy arising from the existential claim that "human nature has no nature". Whether is be a presupposition devoid of any immediate value and implication for education, it may be raised that this is just a claim out of a multitude of other claims, valid or not, that an existentialist believes or adheres in. Educationally, Existentialism, as the case is in Realism, concerns itself more on how to gear the child up to better equip him with an understanding and acceptance of the demands made upon him by the laws of nature. Or, take the educational framework from Idealism. Educationally, Idealism is ideal-centered where learners are made to reflect through their selves, the eternal understandings of an Ideal existence. These may perhaps all fall under speculative statements and belief-systems, but this after all, is what Orteza incorporated as explanation in her attempt to answer her third motivational question, "What may we presuppose?". Did she not suggest that depending upon the nature of the statement under consideration, one must caution oneself from jumping to conclusions and consider first the knowledge domain of which the presupposed claim is a legitimate part?

There is hardly any dispute to Orteza's claim that clarity and precision in language need to be upheld in all possible situations where they are deemed necessary and due. She argued quite strongly on her first question, "What do you mean?". Her vivid differentiation of the concepts of teaching, training, conditioning, and indoctrinating is most enlightening to say the least. Properly defined, she has successfully linked teaching to learning and appropriately labeled them as "try verbs" based on the uncertainty - whether that of success or failure, of their outcomes.

Perhaps the only point that needs to be raised here is whether or not, Genetics figures much on the uncertainty of teaching-learning outcomes. It must be noted that central (or, associational?) to the intrinsic capacity of a learner to process statements in a given linguistic situation is the nature of the statement in question. Does it fall in a knowledge domain of high heritability value? If so, then all that the teacher has to do is help the learner optimize his genetic potential without much intervention to stimulate the learner's inclination, which in this case is genetically predetermined.

As to the second question,"How do you know?", Orteza's most fundamental claim centers on the proposition that "one who knows" is in a mental state that is cognizant of the truth of his claim and that such truth is verified to be true indeed. She managed to bring this idea out by providing a pointillistic description of the entirety of the knowing process, considering as discriminants for the making of a strong or weak case, the conditions of truth, evidence, and beliefs.

With very little doubt, all three questions have successfully carved out a place for Analytic Philosophy of education in the education and training of school teachers. Only a few randomly germinated questions come to mind. Like, why at all must Analytic Philosophy be labeled as a second order activity? Can it not be a case of an activity preceding the task of education and completing it?

Lastly, on account of the title, can the term education not provide a knowledge domain in which the term training finds a logical bearing?